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Meritless Historical Arguments in
Second Amendment Litigation
by MARK ANTHONY FRASSETTO*

Introduction
In 2008, in District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court held for
the first time that the Second Amendment protected an individual right to
possess firearms for purposes of self-defense.1 The Court’s decision, written
by the late Justice Antonin Scalia, was the culmination of a decades-long
effort advocating for an individual-rights reading of the Second Amendment
and the application of an originalist legal methodology in which rights have
Specifically, under Justice Scalia’s
a fixed historical meaning.2
methodology, the fixed meaning of an individual right is the original public
understanding, that is, how the right would have been understood by the
average informed speaker of the English language at the time of its
ratification.3 Justice Scalia’s opinion looked at centuries of historical
treatises, statutes, and cases to come to the conclusion that the original public
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Senior Counsel; Deputy Director, Second Amendment History and Scholarship,
Everytown for Gun Safety, B.A. Marquette University, J.D. Georgetown University Law Center.
I would like to thank Eric Ruben, Saul Cornell, William J. Taylor Jr., and my wife for their
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of the UC Hastings College of the Law for all of their work organizing this symposium and volume.
The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those
of Everytown for Gun Safety.
1. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
2. Lawrence Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV.
923, 924 (2009) (“Collectively, the opinions in Heller represent the most important and extensive
debate on the role of original meaning in constitutional interpretation among the members of the
contemporary Supreme Court.”); see also Mark Anthony Frassetto, The Use and Misuse of History
in Second Amendment Litigation, in THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES AND
THE DEBATE ON THE 2ND AMENDMENT (Jennifer Tucker, Bart Hacker & Margaret Vining eds.)
(forthcoming 2019).
3. Heller, 554 U.S. at 576–77 (“In interpreting this text, we are guided by the principle that
‘[t]he Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in
their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning.’”) (citing United States v.
Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931)).
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meaning of the Second Amendment was to protect an individual right to keep
and bear arms rather than a right tied to militia service.4
Since Heller and the subsequent Supreme Court decision, McDonald v.
City of Chicago, which incorporated the individual right against the states,
Second Amendment litigation and scholarship has focused in large part on
questions about the historical understanding of the Second Amendment.5
One area where this historical analysis has been especially pronounced is in
litigation over the scope of the Second Amendment right outside of the
home.6 Litigants, amici (including the organization which employs the
author of this article), and scholars fiercely debate the meaning of historical
statutes, treatises, and cases, arguing about the scope of the right to carry
arms outside of the home at the time of the Second and Fourteenth
Amendments’ ratifications.7 These debates address historical statutes, cases,
treatises, and other legal sources spanning two countries and several
centuries.
Most law review articles attempt to address difficult or hotly contested
legal issues. This is not one of those kinds of articles. Rather than address
the hard questions about the originalist methodology or the complicated
firearms regulatory landscape surrounding the ratification of the Second and
Fourteenth Amendments, this article will address the frivolous arguments

41063-hco_46-3 Sheet No. 19 Side B
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4. Heller, 554 U.S. at 616. The Heller majority’s conclusion remains a hotly contested
question. It was a sharp break from the Court’s previous jurisprudence and the Court split 5-4 in
the case. See also United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939) (upholding registration requirement
for sawed-off shotgun based on an understanding of the Second Amendment tied closely to militia
service). Recent linguistics scholarship has called the Heller Court’s conclusions about the original
public meaning into serious doubt. See Neal Goldfarb, Corpora and the Second Amendment:
“bear”, LAWNLINGUISTICS (Dec. 16, 2018), https://lawnlinguistics.com/corpora-and-the-secondamendment (discussing meaning of the term “bear” at the time of the ratification of the Second
Amendment); Allison L. LaCroix, Historical Semantics and the Meaning of the Second
Amendment, THE PANORAMA, Aug. 3, 2018, http://thepanorama.shear.org/2018/08/03/historicalsemantics-and-the-meaning-of-the-second-amendment/. Professor Dennis Baron’s article in this
volume further elaborates on this research, Dennis Baron, Corpus Evidence Illuminates the
Meaning of Bear Arms, 46 HASTINGS CON. L.Q. 509 (2019).
5. 561 U.S. 742 (2010). See, e.g., Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2018); Wrenn
v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Peruta v. Cty. Of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919
(9th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
6. Young, 896 F.3d 1044; Wrenn, 864 F.3d 650; Peruta, 824 F.3d 919.
7. See e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Everytown for Gun Safety in Support of Appellees and
Affirmance, Peruta v. Cty. Of San Diego (9th Cir. Apr. 30, 2015) (Nos. 10-56971, 11-16255); Brief
of Amicus Curiae National Rifle Association of America, Inc. in Support of Appellants and
Reversal, Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659 (1st Cir. 2018) (No. 17-2202); Eric M. Ruben & Saul
Cornell, Firearm Regionalism and Public Carry: Placing Southern Antebellum Case Law in
Context, 125 YALE L.J. F. 121 (2015), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/firearm-regionalismand-public-carry; David B. Kopel, The History of Firearm Magazines and Magazine Prohibitions,
88 ALB. L. REV. 849 (2015).
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8. Saul Cornell, The Right to Keep and Carry Arms in Anglo-American Law: Preserving
Liberty and Keeping the Peace, 80 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 11 (2017); David Kopel, George
Mocsary et al., FIREARMS LAW AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT: REGULATION, RIGHTS AND
POLICY (2012); The Second Amendment Wild Card: The Persisting Relevance of the “Hybrid”
Interpretation of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 81 TENN. L. REV. 597 (2014); Darrell Miller,
Self-Defense, Defense of Others, and the State, 80 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 85 (2017).
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made by many plaintiffs in Second Amendment cases, some of which have
unfortunately made their way into district and circuit court decisions. These
arguments, often made in a misleading sentence or two, usually take a few
paragraphs to effectively rebut, paragraphs which the state and local
governments defending against challenges to gun laws generally do not have
the time, necessary expertise, or word count to include in their briefing. This
article aims to provide easy answers to these arguments, hopefully allowing
both the courts and the parties to focus on the serious issues of debate.
This article is not asserting that all the historical issues surrounding the
Second Amendment are simple, or subject to easy answers. There are serious
arguments about history to be made by both sides in Second Amendment
scholarship and litigation. Many have been made by the scholars
contributing to this volume.8 Assessing the original public meaning of rights
based on centuries-old legal traditions, which requires the analysis of case
law and statutes drawn from an unfamiliar legal tradition and culture, is not
easy work and does not yield simple answers. Unfortunately, these issues
worthy of serious discussion are often obscured by frivolous arguments that
require time-consuming responses and take focus away from the actual
issues in the case.
Part II of this article will discuss post-Heller public-carry litigation,
focusing on the serious historical arguments driving these cases. Part III will
discuss and rebut some of the meritless historical arguments that have been
made and adopted in Second Amendment litigation, specifically (a)
anecdotes about the founders carrying firearms in public or advocating for
the carrying of firearms in public; (b) the argument that founding-era militia
and other public defense obligations meant a reciprocal right to generally
carry firearms in public for self-defense existed; and (c) the claim that the
only weapons which could not be carried in public were those deemed
‘dangerous and unusual.’ Finally, Part IV of the article will draw
conclusions about these materials.
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I. Major Historical Issues in Post-Heller Second Amendment
Public Carry Litigation.

02/26/2019 14:13:21

9. 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
10. See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012); Kachalsky v. County of
Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2d. Cir. 2012); Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426 (3d. Cir. 2013); Woollard
v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013); Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir.
2016).
11. See, e.g., Moore, 702 F.3d (complete prohibition); Kachalsky, 701 F.3d (good cause);
Drake, 724 F.3d (good cause) Woollard, 712 F.3d (good cause); Peruta, 824 F.3d (good cause).
12. See Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 668–69 (1st Cir. 2018) (adopting the two-part test
and discussing its near universal adoption in other circuits).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 669.
15. Id.
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In 2010, two years after the Heller decision, the Supreme Court returned
to the Second Amendment in McDonald v. City of Chicago, in which it
incorporated the Second Amendment against the states and struck down the
city’s prohibition on handguns.9 After the McDonald decision, gun rights
activists began challenging a broad scope of state and local gun laws across
the country. Among the most prominent Second Amendment cases were
challenges to state public carry licensing laws.10 These challenges primarily
focused on laws completely prohibiting the carrying of firearms in public
and licensing systems that required those seeking to carry firearms in public
to make a showing that they had a need for self-defense greater than that of
the general public.11
Since Heller, virtually every circuit court has adopted a method of
analyzing Second Amendment cases known as the two-part test.12 This test
first asks whether a challenged firearm (or sometimes other weapon)
regulation restricts conduct that falls within the scope of the right protected
by the Second Amendment as historically understood. A court makes this
determination using the text of the Second Amendment and the history and
tradition of firearms regulation in the United States and England.13 If the
regulation does not fall within the scope of the right as historically
understood, then the challenge fails.14 However, if the regulation does
implicate the right, then the court applies some level of scrutiny determined
on a sliding scale, from intermediate scrutiny for less significant
infringements such as licensing to a categorical prohibition on laws such as
the handgun bans struck down in Heller and McDonald.15
Given this methodology, it should be unsurprising that in every major
challenge to public carry regulations, historical arguments have played an
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16. See, e.g., Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 94–97; Drake, 724 F.3d at 432–35; Peruta, 824 F.3d at
929–39.
17. See, e.g., Repository of Historical Gun Laws, DUKE U. SCH. OF L., https://law.duke.edu/g
unlaws/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2019) (massive repository of historical firearms regulations produced
after Heller).
18. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 603 (2008).
19. Statute of Northampton, 2 Edw. 3, 258, c. 3 (1328) (Eng.).
20. Brief of Amici Curiae National Rifle Association of America, Inc. in Support of
Appellants and Reversal at 9, Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659 (1st Cir. Dec. 15, 2017) (No. 172202) (“The requirement of an intent to terrify the public was carried down by English courts into
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.”); Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and
Bear Arms For Self Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV.
1443, 1481 (2009) (“Even carrying normally dangerous arms was punishable if it was done in a
way that indicated a likely hostile intent, perhaps simply by the unusualness of the behavior . . . .”).
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important role in the courts’ analysis.16 In the cases immediately after
McDonald, the post-Heller Second Amendment historical scholarship had
not had time to produce historical research and analysis responsive to Heller,
so the history presented, and the courts’ analysis, is a bit scattershot and
unsophisticated compared to later cases. In the last five years an enormous
amount of research into the historical regulation of firearms has resulted in
clarification of the issues at dispute in the historical debate.17
In these more recent cases the historical arguments essentially break
down into four categories of sources: (1) English history and founding-era
regulation; (2) Antebellum firearms regulation; (3) Antebellum and
Reconstruction-era case law; and (4) postbellum regulation.
The debate about English and founding-era-American history primarily
focuses on how the carrying of weapons in public was regulated during the
eighteenth century. This is important because Heller stated the Second
Amendment “was widely understood to codify a pre-existing right, rather
than to fashion a new one.”18 Therefore, if the carrying of firearms was
prohibited in England or the United States during the founding period, then
the right ratified in the Second Amendment could not reasonably be
understood to protect an activity that the founding generation prohibited.
This debate largely centers around the eighteenth-century understanding of
a fourteenth-century English statute prohibiting going armed “by night or by
day, in Fairs, Markets, nor in the presence of the Justices or other Ministers
nor in no part elsewhere.”19 Gun rights advocates and some scholars claim
that by the eighteenth century, the statute had developed a mens rea
component, meaning a violation occurred only if a person carrying arms had
the intent or purpose to terrorize or threaten.20 Conversely, scholars and
litigators arguing for a more limited right argue that public terror was the
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natural result of going armed in public and no additional intent was necessary
for the conduct to be prohibited.21
Litigants also debate the meaning of Antebellum-era public-carry laws.
The most significant controversy surrounds the meaning of a law first passed
in Massachusetts in 1836 prohibiting going armed “without reasonable cause
to fear an assault or other injury, or violence to his person, or family or
property,” and allowing violators to be arrested and forced to post a bond
upon application from “any person having reasonable cause to fear an injury
or breach of the peace.”22 Disputes over the meaning of this law again
revolve around whether violating the law required an intent to terrify or
threaten, as well as whether the requirement to pay a surety bond constituted
a criminal sanction.23
The dispute over Antebellum case law is a bit more complicated.
Proponents of a broad right to carry firearms in public cite to several, mostly
Southern, cases in which courts either struck down complete prohibitions on
public carry or upheld complete prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons
because those desiring to carry firearms could still do so openly (exposed
outside of the clothing).24 Advocates for a more limited right respond by
arguing that these cases are outliers representing a uniquely Southern view
of gun rights driven by white Southerners’ fears of a slave uprising.25 They

41063-hco_46-3 Sheet No. 21 Side B
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21. Patrick Charles, The Faces of the Second Amendment Outside the Home, Take Two: How
We Got Here and Why it Matters, 64 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 373, 468–69 (2016) (discussing the
development of the narrow interpretation of the Statute of Northampton which developed in the
mid twentieth century); see, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Historians, Legal Scholars, & CRPA
Foundation in Support of Appellees and in Support of Affirmance at 14, Wrenn v. District of
Columbia, 864 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (No. 15-7057) (“No State prohibited the Public Carrying
of Arms in the Early Republic.”); Mark Anthony Frassetto, The First Congressional Debate on
Public Carry and What it Tells Us About Firearm Regionalism, 40 CAMPBELL L. REV. 335, 338
(2018) (noting disagreement); Brief of Amicus Curiae Everytown for Gun Safety in Support of
Appellants and Reversal at 6, Grace v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. July 13, 2016)
(No. 16-7067) (“In other words, because carrying a dangerous weapon (such as a firearm) in
populated public places naturally terrified the people, it was a crime against the peace—even if
unaccompanied by a threat, violence, or any additional breach of the peace.”)
22. 1836 Mass. Acts 750, c. 134, § 16.
23. Ruben & Cornell, supra note 7; David Kopel, Ninth Circuit strikes Hawaii law that only
security guards may get handgun carry permits, REASON.COM: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July
24, 2018), https://reason.com/volokh/2018/07/24/ninth-circuit-upholds-right-to-licensed.
24. Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. 90 (1822); Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846), State
v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612, 617 (1840).
25. Ruben & Cornell, supra note 7; see also Mark Anthony Frassetto, The Law and Politics
of Firearms Regulation in Reconstruction Texas, 4 TEX. A&M L. REV. 95 (2016) (showing a more
permissive Southern view); Mark Anthony Frassetto, The First Congressional Debate on Public
Carry and What it Tells Us About Firearms Regionalism, 40 CAMPBELL L. REV. 335 (2018)
(showing broad support among Northerners and Republicans for public carry regulations and
opposition among many Southern Democrats).
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also argue that even in the South, this understanding of the right was not
monolithic and shifted in the direction of a more limited right by the time of
the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.26 Further, most Southern
decisions do not actually call into doubt the most frequently challenged
public carry systems, which allow the carrying of firearms when necessary
for self-defense.27
Finally, those arguing for the legality of public carry regulations claim
that post-war laws completely prohibiting carrying weapons in populated
areas or requiring a particular need for self-defense to carry concealed
weapons show that modern licensing laws that require a showing of selfdefense are longstanding and therefore consistent with the Second
Amendment.28 Those challenging gun laws attempt to minimize the
importance and scope of the laws banning carry in urban areas. They also
argue that because many of the good cause laws do not discuss the open carry
of firearms, they allowed for a broad right carry in public.
The author has strong views on all these historical debates and believes
that the history of firearms regulation supports the constitutionality of laws
prohibiting carrying without a showing of specific need.29 That being said,
these debates all raise complicated historical issues that require significant
research and analysis to fully understand and are, to some degree, subject to
varying interpretations. In contrast, the next section discusses the historical
arguments frequently used in Second Amendment litigation that do not
require this level of analysis to determine that they are historically
inaccurate.
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26. State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18 (1842); Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. 154 (1840); State v.
Huntly, 25 N.C. 418 (1843); Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. 165 (1871); English v. State, 35 Tex. 473
(1872); State v. Duke, 42 Tex. 455 (1874).
27. But see Bliss, 12 Ky. at 91–92 (“whatever restrains the full and complete exercise of that
right, though not an entire destruction of it, is forbidden by the explicit language of the
constitution.”).
28. See e.g., 1869 N.M. Laws 321, § 1 (totally prohibiting carry in populated areas); 1871
Tex. Laws 1322, art. 6512 (prohibiting carry without “reasonable grounds for fearing an unlawful
attack on his person” that was “immediate and pressing.”); 1873 Minn. Laws, 1025, §17 (similar,
in the vein of the Massachusetts model discussed above); 1875 Wyo. Laws 352, ch. 52, § 1907
(prohibiting carrying in populated areas).
29. See e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Everytown for Gun Safety in Support of Appellees and
Affirmance, Peruta v. Cty. Of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2015) (Nos. 10-56971, 11-16255).
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II. Meritless Historical Arguments in
Second Amendment Litigation.
A. Anecdotes About the Founders Carrying Firearms in Public

02/26/2019 14:13:21

30. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 23–24, Gould v. O’Leary, No. 17-2202 (1st Cir. March
5, 2018); Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants, Malpasso v. Pallozzi, No. 18-2377 (4th Cir. Dec. 20, 2018).
31. Grace v. District of Columbia, 187 F. Supp. 3d 124, 136 (D.D.C. 2016).
32. Id. (citing McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 360 (Thomas, J.
concurring)).
33. 5 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES app. B, 19 (St. George Tucker ed., 1803);
See also Mark Anthony Frassetto, To The Terror of the People: Public Disorder Crimes and the
Original Public Understanding of the Second Amendment, 43 S. ILL. L. REV. 61, 85 (2018)
(discussing the regional nature of Tucker’s description, which would have varied greatly by in more
urban parts of the early Republic).

41063-hco_46-3 Sheet No. 22 Side B

Plaintiffs in Second Amendment public carry cases frequently cite to
anecdotes about members of the founding generation carrying firearms in
support of arguments for a broad right to carry firearms in public.30 They
use these anecdotes to make two claims: (1) a general right to carry firearms
in public was protected by the term “bear arms” in the Second Amendment;
and (2) carrying firearms in public was not prohibited at the time the Second
Amendment was ratified. Some courts have accepted these arguments. In
an opinion striking down Washington, D.C.’s public carry licensing system,
District Court Judge Richard Leon stated that “it is unquestionable that the
public carrying of firearms was widespread during the colonial and founding
Eras” and that fact “provide[s] an essential context for what the people who
ratified the Second Amendment understood arms bearing to entail.”31
However, Judge Leon also acknowledged that “‘the simple fact that the
Framers engaged in certain conduct does not necessarily prove they forbade
its prohibition by government.’”32
Arms-carrying for purposes of hunting, sport, and collective selfdefense was likely common in parts of the largely agrarian founding-era
America. One founding-era source stated: “In many parts of the United
States, a man no more thinks, of going out of his house on any occasion,
without his rifle or musket in his hand, than an European fine gentleman
without his sword by his side.”33 However, gun rights advocates’ evidence
of the founders commonly carrying firearms in public while going about
normal activities is remarkably weak. Presumably, these highly motivated
organizations, including the National Rifle Association and its affiliated
scholars, have done their utmost to find the sources most strongly supporting
their view of the Second Amendment. Yet their evidence is so thin and the
anecdotes they cite are so easily rebuttable that the absence of any strong
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evidence, at least to some degree, undermines their claim that carrying in
public was common among the founders.
1. George Washington

02/26/2019 14:13:21

34. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants, Gould v. O’Leary, No. 17-2202 (1st Cir. March 5, 2018);
Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants, Malpasso v. Pallozzi, No. 18-2377 (4th Cir. Dec. 20, 2018); Grace,
187 F. Supp. 3d at 137.
35. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 23–24, Gould v. O’Leary, No. 17-2202 (1st Cir. March
5, 2018) (citing WILLIAM M. DARLINGTON, CHRISTOPHER GIST’S JOURNALS 85–86 (1893); see
also Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants, Malpasso v. Pallozzi at 19, No. 18-2377 (4th Cir. Dec. 20,
2018).
36. George Washington and The French and Indian War, GEORGE WASHINGTON’S MOUNT
VERNON, https://www.mountvernon.org/george-washington/french-indian-war/washington-andthe-french-indian-war/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2019).
37. Id.
38. See generally, The French and Indian War, BRITTANICA.COM, https://www.britannica.com/
event/French-and-Indian-War (last visited Feb. 2, 2019).
39. See WILLIAM M. DARLINGTON, CHRISTOPHER GIST’S JOURNALS 85–86 (1893),
https://archive.org/details/christophergists00gistuoft.
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Plaintiffs have been especially eager to enlist examples of the
Revolutionary War commander-in-chief and first president carrying firearms
in public to support their claim that public carry was not regulated during the
founding generation.34 The examples they have found, however, have not
supported these claims. In a recent challenge to the public carry licensing
systems in Boston and Brookline, Massachusetts, the plaintiffs stated, “[t]he
practices of the Founding generation confirm that the right to carry arms was
well-established. George Washington, for example, carried a firearm on an
expedition into the Ohio Country.”35
The Plaintiffs’ cited source discusses a military and diplomatic
expedition by George Washington under orders from Virginia’s governor, to
travel through the Ohio frontier to a French Fort to warn the French against
further intruding into the Ohio territory.36 During the time of the expedition,
Washington was an adjutant major overseeing Virginia’s militia.37 The Ohio
territory through which Washington travelled was largely unsettled, having
been set aside for the Native Americans by British decree, and the expedition
faced possible attacks from both Native Americans and the French.38 In fact,
on the exact page cited by the Plaintiffs, the author, Washington’s travel
companion, describes an attack by a Native American guide and threats that
the nearby Ottawa tribe would scalp Washington and his companions.39
Washington and his companions going armed in these circumstances, when
he was a high-ranking military officer travelling through hostile territory on
orders from the governor obviously does nothing to “confirm that the right
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to carry arms was well established.”40 The First Circuit did not buy this
argument, instead upholding Boston and Brookline’s public carry systems
under intermediate scrutiny.
Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia, which cited to a perhaps even more
absurd historical anecdote in its Grace v. District of Columbia decision
enjoining enforcement of Washington, D.C.’s public carry licensing
system.41 The anecdote continues to be cited by plaintiffs challenging public
carry licensing systems.42
To understand why relying on this anecdote makes little sense, it is most
helpful to cite it in full:

This story comes from a privately published semi-biographical book
written from the papers of Benjamin Ogloe Tayloe, a wealthy plantation
owner and prominent Whig supporter of the Jacksonian and late-Antebellum

02/26/2019 14:13:21

40. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 23, Gould v. O’Leary, No. 17-2202 (1st Cir. March 5,
2018).
41. Grace v. District of Columbia, 187 F. Supp. 3d 124, 137 (D.D.C. 2016) (“For example,
when George Washington traveled between Alexandria and Mount Vernon he holstered pistols to
his saddle “[a]s was then the custom.”).
42. See Brief of Michelle Flanagan et. al. at 26, Flanagan v. Becerra, No. 18-55717 (9th Cir.
Oct. 2, 2018) (citing Grace v. District of Columbia, 187 F. Supp. 3d at 136–37).
43. BENJAMIN OGLE TAYLOE, IN MEMORIAM: BENJAMIN OGLE TAYLOE 95 (1872).
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Soon after the close of the Revolutionary War, General
Washington went to Alexandria on horseback, accompanied by
his negro servant. The road then used lay through the farm of a
desperado who had committed murder, a stranger to the General,
the main road having become impassable. As was then the
custom, the General had holsters with pistols in them, to his
saddle. On returning to Mount Vernon, as General was about to
enter on this private road, a stranger on horseback barred the way,
and said to him, “You shall not pass this way.” “You don’t know
me,” said the General. “Yes, I do,” said the ruffian: “you are
General Washington, who commanded the army in the
Revolution and if you attempt to pass me I shall shoot you.”
General Washington called his servant, Billy, to him, and taking
out a pistol, examined the priming, and then handed it to Billy,
saying, “if this person shoots me, do you shoot him;” and cooly
passed on without molestation.43
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44. Benjamin Ogle Tayloe, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Ogle_
Tayloe (last visited Feb. 2, 2019).
45. TAYLOE, supra note 43, at 93.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 94.
48. Id. at 95–96 (“At Mount Vernon a guest who slept in an adjacent chamber is reported to
have heard a curtain lecture from Mrs. Washington to her lord The General received it in silence
and at last said Good night Mrs Washington and was heard to turn over bed Mr. Buchanan when I
related the above remarked that bore with it internal evidence of its truth.”).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 96.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 99.
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era.44 The book was commissioned by his widow as a memorial to her
deceased husband.45 The anecdote relied on in the Grace decision comes
from a section of the book titled “Anecdotes and Reminiscences” comprised
of a series of jokes, tall tales, and farfetched stories.46 These vignettes were
written by Tayloe “during the dark and gloomy days of the Civil War,” sixty
years after Washington’s death, to “relieve his mind from the depressing
influence of the times.”47 Tayloe’s stories are clearly not anything
resembling history.
The two other stories about Washington in Tayloe’s book show why his
narrative should not be relied on. The first describes a scene between George
and Martha Washington as they were lying in bed, during which Martha
Washington lectured her husband and George Washington, after listening
silently, responded “Good night, Mrs. Washington” and turned away from
her in bed.48 This joke about marital roles was described as “b[earing]
internal evidence of truth.”49
The following story in Tayloe’s book falls even further into the absurd.
In it a young Washington travelling in the back-country of Virginia stumbled
upon and then won a jumping competition for the hand of a wealthy young
woman in marriage.50 Washington then saw that the woman preferred
another competitor and, being the model of chivalry, forfeited his prize and
allowed the couple to marry.51 Other anecdotes mostly appear to have
revolved around puns and it does not appear that Tayloe intended for readers
to understand them as true.52
In the context of Tayloe’s entire book—a compilation of assorted
papers and journals written by a man born three years before Washington
died—the humorous anecdote about George Washington seems intended to
convey a sense of Washington’s courage rather than a retelling of an actual
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event.53 This is not the type of history from which decisions about the
original public meaning of the Second Amendment should be made.54
2. John Adams

Another anecdote supposedly showing the founding fathers supporting
a broad right to carry in public comes from John Adams’s legal
representation of the British soldiers on trial for the Boston Massacre.55 Gun
rights groups claim: “John Adams conceded that, ‘in this country, every
private person is authorized to arm himself; and on the strength of this
authority I do not deny the inhabitants had a right to arm themselves at that
time for their defence.’”56 The Grace court adopted this view.57
The supposed example of John Adams supporting public carry comes
from remarks he made during his defense of British soldiers in the Boston
However, contrary to the gun rights plaintiffs’
Massacre trial.58
characterization, Adams was not discussing a general right to carry, but
rather specifically talking about how people have a right to arm themselves
to put down riots, the action which the soldiers were engaged in. The full
quote makes this clear:
And so, perhaps the killing of dangerous rioters may be justified
by any private persons, who cannot otherwise suppress them or
defend themselves from them, inasmuch as every private person
seems to authorized by the law to arm himself for the purpose
aforesaid. – Hawkins, p. 71 § 14.
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53. Even if the story were true, it describes Washington riding armed in a rural area when
faced with a specific threat, “a desperado who had committed murder,” providing little support for
the modern argument that carrying guns in public is generally allowed. TAYLOE, supra note 43, at
95.
54. One interesting point is that Tayloe felt the need to say, “[a]s was then the custom, the
General had holsters with pistols in them, to his saddle,” implying that in the 1860s when these
anecdotes are written it would not have been usual to go armed in public. Id. at 95. It seems
meaningful that in the only period of which Tayloe has direct knowledge it was apparently not the
custom to ride armed.
55. British soldiers had killed five colonists during a violent confrontation between British
soldiers and the locals. While the event was portrayed by patriots like Samuel Adams and Paul
Revere as a massacre of a peaceful crowd, the soldiers were tried and acquitted on most charges
after able representation by John Adams. DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 65–68 (2001).
56. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 24, Gould v. O’Leary, No. 17-2202 (1st Cir. March 5,
2018) (citing John Adams, First Day’s Speech in Defense of the British Soldiers Accused of
Murdering Attucks, Gray and Others, in the Boston Riot of 1770, in 6 MASTERPIECES OF
ELOQUENCE 2569, 2578 (Hazeltine et al. eds., 1905)); Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 19,
Malpasso v. Palozzi, No. 18-2377 (4th Cir. Dec. 20, 2018).
57. Grace v. District of Columbia, 187 F. Supp. 3d 124, 137 (D.D.C. 2016).
58. Adams, supra note 56, at 2560–93.
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Here every private person is authorized to arm himself; and on
the strength of this authority I do not deny the inhabitants had a
right to arms themselves at that time for their defence, not for
offence. That distinction is material and must be attended to.59
The citation to William Hawkins comes from Adams’s discussion of
justifiable homicide and the circumstances in which a killing in self-defense
would be legal.60 During the portion of his remarks relied upon by gun rights
plaintiffs and the Grace court, Adams was citing a variety of sources
explaining when lethal force could be used in self-defense.61 Reading the
passage in the context of the citations to legal authority both immediately
following and preceding it, by far the most sensible reading is that the
language was tied to suppressing riots rather than a generalized right to carry.
Breaking it down in more detail, Adams’s line, “[h]ere every private
person is authorized to arm himself,” is in reference to the immediately
preceding line, “every private person is authorized to arm himself for the
purpose aforesaid.”62 That is, every person is authorized to arm oneself to
defend against and suppress rioters. Adams’s next line, “on the strength of
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59. Adams, supra note 56, at 2578.
60. 1 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE ON THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 81 (John Curwood
ed., 8th ed. 1824) (same language from later edition).
61. Adams, supra note 56, at 2577 (citing MICHAEL FOSTER, CROWN CASES 274 (Michael
Dodson ed. 1762) “Where a known felony is attempted upon the person be it to rob or murder here
the party assaulted may repel force with force”); id. (“Yet it seems that a private person a fortiori
an officer of justice who happens unavoidably to kill another in endeavoring to defend himself from
or suppress dangerous rioters may justify the fact inasmuch as he only does his duty in aid of the
public justice”) (citing HAWKINS, supra note 60, at 73);
And I can see no reason Why a person who without provocation is assaulted by
another in any place whatsoever in such a manner as plainly shows an intent to murder
him as by discharging a pistol or pushing at him with a drawn sword etc may not
justify killing such an assailant as much as if he had attempted to rob him For is not
he who attempts to murder me more injurious than he who barely attempts to rob me
And can it be more justifiable to fight for my goods than for my life.
Id. (citing HAWKINS, supra note 60, at 72);
And not only he who on an assault retreats to the wall or some such strait beyond
which he can go no further before he kills the other is judged by the law to act upon
unavoidable necessity but also he who being assaulted in such a manner and in such
a place that he cannot go back without manifestly endangering his life kills the other
without retreating at all.
Id. at 2578 (citing HAWKINS, supra note 60, at 75;
Id. (“And an officer who kills one that insults him in the execution of his office and where a private
person that kills one who feloniously assaults him in the highway may justify the fact without ever
giving back at all.”) (citing HAWKINS, supra note 60, at 75).
62. Id. at 2577–78.
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this authority the inhabitants had a right to arm themselves at that time for
their defence, not for offence[,]” references the authority of the Hawkins
citation.63 Adams then states that the distinction between arming for
purposes of offence and “defence,” “must be attended to[,]” before citing a
pair of Hawkins citations about self-defense.64
This reading of the Adams quote places it sensibly within the context
of Adams’s discussion about the circumstances of the Boston Massacre and
when self-defense was allowed under the law of the time. On the other hand,
the reading of the passage by gun rights activists makes Adams’s statement
a non sequitur detached completely from the context of Adam’s defense of
the British soldiers and discussion of self-defense standards.
3. Thomas Jefferson

One of the most prominent and most outrageous of the founder public
carry anecdotes comes from a letter written by Thomas Jefferson to his
nephew Peter Carr.65 The Grace decision cited to this letter in which
Jefferson “advised his nephew to ‘[l]et your gun . . . be the constant
companion of your walks.’”66 On its face this quote seems like compelling
evidence that Jefferson believed carrying firearms generally in public was
allowed and, indeed, an advisable course of action.
However, the flaws in this viewpoint become readily apparent when one
looks at the full context of the Jefferson quotation, which reads:

02/26/2019 14:13:21

63. Adams, supra note 56, at 2577–78.
64. Id. at 2578.
65. For a detailed analysis of Jefferson’s views on gun rights, see David Thomas Konig,
Thomas Jefferson’s Armed Citizenry and the Republican Militia, 1 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 250 (2008).
66. Grace v. District of Columbia, 187 F. Supp. 3d 124, 137(D.D.C. 2016) (citing 1 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 398 (H. A. Washington ed., 1853); Brief of PlaintiffsAppellants at 24, Gould v. O’Leary, No. 17-2202 (1st Cir. March 5, 2018) (citing 1 THE WORKS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 398 (H. A. Washington ed., 1884).
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Give about two of them [hours], every day, to exercise; for health
must not be sacrificed to learning. A strong body makes the mind
strong. As to the species of exercise, I advise the gun. While this
gives a moderate exercise to the body, it gives boldness,
enterprise, and independence to the mind. Games played with
the ball, and others of that nature, are too violent for the body,
and stamp no character on the mind. Let your gun therefore be
the constant companion of your walks. Never think of taking a
book with you. The object of walking is to relax the mind. You
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should therefore not permit yourself even to think while you
walk; but divert your attention by the objects surrounding you.67
The Jefferson quote is clearly about hunting and sports shooting for
recreation and relaxation rather than travelling with a firearm for purposes
of self-defense.68 The fact that Jefferson was speaking only of the limited
circumstances of leisure is made even clearer by the eight words following
the Grace Plaintiffs’ citation: “never think of taking a book with you.”69
Thomas Jefferson, perhaps the most ardent bibliophile of the founding
generation, whose book collection constituted the Library of Congress’s
original collection, who once proclaimed, “I cannot live without books,”
obviously would not have admonished his nephew against taking books with
him on his travels or everyday business.70
4. Boston Tea Party

Another absurd attempt to anecdotally tie the founders to a right to carry
firearms in public cites to the participants in the Boston Tea Party. Plaintiffs
in a recent public carry case in Washington, D.C. cited to “[t]he Boston Tea
Party’s ‘Indians’ [who] were ‘each arm’d with a hatchet or axe, and pair
pistols.’”71 It should go without saying that the Tea Partiers’ violent and
illegal conduct was clearly not representative of what conduct was
considered legal or acceptable under normal circumstances. This argument
could equally be made for a right to violently seize and destroy private
property to protest tax policy.
B. Compelled Arms Bearing as an Argument for A Right to Go Armed in
Public.

02/26/2019 14:13:21

67. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Peter Carr (Paris, Aug. 19, 1785) (on file with Yale Law
School Library).
68. Id.
69. See id.; see Mem. of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs’ Applications for a
Preliminary and/or Permeant Injunction at 15, Grace v. District of Columbia, No. 1:15-cv-02234RJL (D.D.C. Dec. 28, 2015).
70. Thomas Jefferson, Jefferson’s Library, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, https://bit.ly/1qBambE
(last visited Feb. 2, 2019).
71. Appellant’s Reply Brief at 17, Wrenn v. District of Columbia, No. 16-7025 (D.C. Cir.
July 27, 2016) (citing LETTERS OF JOHN ANDREWS, ESQ., OF BOSTON, 1772-1776 13 (Winthrop
Sargent, ed., 1866).
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Another weak argument often made by plaintiffs is that because, at
certain times during the colonial and founding period, states required certain
people to carry firearms for militia or other self-defense purposes, there is a
general right to carry firearms in public. In one recent case, the Plaintiffs
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argued: “Plainly, if the law imposed on individuals a civic duty to bear arms
‘for public-safety reasons,’ the law necessarily conferred on those citizens a
corresponding right to do so.”72 This argument refers to militia and militiarelated laws passed in several states during the colonial and founding period
requiring, for example, citizens to bring arms to church on Sundays or to
carry arms when leaving the secured area of a settlement.73 Similarly, all of
the American colonies with the exception of Pennsylvania had militia laws
requiring citizens of the colony to bear arms in the state militia in certain
circumstances.74 Again, despite the readily apparent flaws in this argument,
it has been adopted by at least one court in a decision striking down public
carry licensing systems.75
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72. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 22–23, Gould v. O’Leary, No. 17-2202 (1st Cir. March
5, 2018) (stating “about half the colonies had laws requiring arms-carrying in certain
circumstances”) (citing NICHOLAS J. JOHNSON & DAVID B. KOPEL ET AL., FIREARMS LAW & THE
SECOND AMENDMENT 106–08 (2012) (internal citations omitted). The Gould plaintiffs also cited
to founding era state constitutional provisions granting a right to ‘bear arms in defense of
themselves and the state’ or ‘bear arms in defense of himself and the state,” and claiming the “
language that is not amenable to a homebound interpretation.” Id. at 23. For the reasons below,
the argument also fails to support a broad right to public carry. See also Brief of PlaintiffsAppellants at 18, Malpasso v. Pallozzi, No. 18-2377 (4th Cir. Dec. 20, 2018) (Similar arguments).
73. See, e.g., 1631 Va. Acts 173, Acts Of February 24th, 1631, Acts XLVII, XLVIII, LI,
available at https://archive.org/details/statutesatlargeb01virg (“Act XLVII: No man shall go or send
abroade without a sufficient party well armed. Act XLVIII: No man shall go to work in the grounds
without their arms, and a sentinel upon them. Act LI: All men that are fitting to bear arms, shall
bring their pieces to the church . . .”); another such law states:
Whereas it is necessary for the security and defence of this province for internal
dangers and insurrections that all persons resorting to places of public worship shall
be obliged to carry arms . . . every male white inhabitant of this province (the
inhabitants of the sea port towns only excepted who shall not be obliged to carry
any other than side arms) who is or shall be liable to bear arms in the militia either
at common musters or times of alarm, and resorting, on any Sunday or other times,
to any church, or other place of divine worship within the parish where such person
shall reside, shall carry with him a gun, or a pair of pistols, in good order and fit
for service, with at least six charges of gun powder and ball, and shall take the said
gun or pistols with him to the pew or seat.
An Act for the Better Security of the Inhabitants by Obliging the Male White Persons to Carry Fire
Arms to Places of Public Worship states 1770, reprinted in 1775-1770 Georgia Colonial Laws 471
(1932).
74. See, e.g., 1693 Mass. Acts 128 (“That all male persons from sixteen years of age to sixty,
(other than such as are hereinafter excepted), shall bear arms and duely attend all musters and
military exercises of the respective troops”); 12 Hening’s Statutes c. 1, p. 9 et seq. (The defense
and safety of the commonwealth depend upon having its citizens properly armed and taught the
knowledge of military duty . . . All free male persons between the ages of eighteen and fifty
years . . . shall be inrolled or formed into companies. There shall be a private muster of every
company once in two months.).
75. Grace v. District of Columbia, 187 F. Supp. 3d 124, 136–37 (D.D.C. 2016).
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Like the anecdotes discussed above, this argument breaks down after
the slightest analysis. The fact that at certain times in American history the
states, or the federal government, have compelled citizens to carry arms is
irrelevant to modern questions about whether a citizen has an individual right
to carry firearms. Government-mandated arms-bearing in situations in
which national or state security is threatened clearly does not indicate broad
acceptance of a private right to carry firearms in public. Carrying arms when
compelled by the government or acting under government authority has been
an exception to the general prohibition on carrying arms since at least 1328,
when the Statute of Northampton, the English prohibition on carrying
weapons in public, excluded from its general prohibition:
[T]he King’s Servants in his presence, and his ministers in
executing of the King’s Precepts, or of their Office, and such be
in their company assisting them, and also [u]pon a Cry made for
Arms to keep the Peace, and the same in such places where such
acts happen.76

76.
77.
78.

02/26/2019 14:13:21

Statute of Northampton, 2 Edw. 3, 258, c. 3 (1328) (Eng.).
HAWKINS, supra note 60, at 136.
Legality of the London Military Foot-Association, reprinted in WILLIAM BLIZZARD,
DESULTORY REFLECTIONS ON POLICE 59, 63 (1785). Gun rights litigants have attempted to
characterize this opinion as supporting a broad right to carry firearms in public, by pointing out the
suppressing riots and repelling invasions is not something that could have been done from the
comfort of home. Plaintiffs-Appellants Brief at 22, Gould v. O’Leary, No. 17-2202 (1st Cir. March
5, 2018). This characterization strips the opinion of its context and mischaracterizes its scope as
dramatically broader than it actually is. The opinion addressed the legality London Military Foot
Association, a protestant self-defense organization and found that because “the possession and use
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During the founding period, prominent treatises made clear that going
armed as part of the militia, posse comitatus, or in defense of the community
was excluded from the generalized prohibition on armed public carry.
Treatise writer William Hawkins, for example, stated that “no person is
within the intention of the said statute [prohibiting carrying weapons], who
arms himself to suppress rioters, rebels, or enemies and endeavors to
suppress rioters, rebels, or enemies and endeavors to suppress such
disturbers of the peace or quiet of the Realm.”77 Similarly, the Recorder of
London, the Senior Circuit Court Judge in the Criminal Court, in an opinion
about the legality of certain local self-defense organizations, stated: “The
lawful purposes for which arms may be used (besides immediate selfdefence) are, the suppression of violent and felonious breaches of the peace
and assistance of the civil magistrate in the execution of the laws, and the
defence of the kingdom against foreign invaders.”78
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In 1886, shortly after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Supreme Court made clear that the duty to carry arms when compelled by
the government did not create a reciprocal right to form armed groups in
Presser v. Illinois.79 In Presser, the Court upheld a conviction for organizing
and parading with a private militia company. The Court rejected the claim
that militia participation outside of a government-organized militia is
protected, stating:
Military organization and military drill and parade under arms
are subjects especially under the control of the government of
every country. They cannot be claimed as a right independent of
law. Under our political system they are subject to the regulation
and control of the State and Federal governments, acting in due
regard to their respective prerogatives and powers. The
Constitution and laws of the United States will be searched in
vain for any support to the view that these rights are privileges
and immunities of citizens of the United States independent of
some specific legislation on the subject.80

02/26/2019 14:13:21

of, to certain purposes, is lawful . . . it cannot be unlawful to learn to use them (for such lawful
purposes) with safety and effect,” and because in some cases arms may only be used collectively,
there is also a right to be “collectively, as well as individually, instructed.” Legality of the London
Military Foot-Association, supra note 78 at 60–61. The opinion made clear though that the right
was but also “a duty[] for all subjects of the realm . . . to assist the sheriff, and other civil magistrates
, in the execution of the laws and the preservation of the public peace.” Id. at 60. The recorder
also made clear “that this right which every protestant most unquestionably possesses individually,
may, and in many cases must, be exercised collectively.” Id. at 60.
79. 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
80. Presser, 116 U.S. at 267.
81. See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939) (upholding the National Firearms Act’s
prohibition on sawed-off shotguns); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008).
82. A criminal defendant does have a right to a jury of his peers, and potential jurors have a
right not to be discriminated against based solely based on race. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79 (1986).
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Similarly, while the government can compel its citizens to carry
machine guns and sawed-off shotguns through a military draft, the Supreme
Court in United States v. Miller, which upheld a prohibitive tax on sawedoff shotguns, made clear that there is not a reciprocal right to own those
weapons in a private capacity.81 This is true of other duties as well. While
every American man has a duty to serve in the military if drafted, there is no
parallel right to serve in the military. Similarly, while there is a duty to serve
on a jury if called, there is no complimentary right to actually serve on a
jury.82
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C. Dangerous and Unusual Weapons as a Limitation on English and
Founding-Era American Public Carry Regulations.

See e.g., Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044, 1064 (9th Cir. 2018).
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 148–49 (1769).
Miller, 307 U.S. 174.
Id. at 177.
Heller, 554 U.S. at 625.
Id. at 627.

02/26/2019 14:13:21

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
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Another dubious historical argument often made by plaintiffs in Second
Amendment challenges is that English and early-American law only
prohibited the carrying of a limited class of “dangerous and unusual
weapons.”83 This view stems from language in Heller interpreting a line in
William Blackstone’s eighteenth-century commentaries, “going armed, with
dangerous or unusual weapons, is a crime against the public peace, by
terrifying the good people of the land.”84 Proponents of a broad right to carry
interpret “dangerous or unusual” much more narrowly than Blackstone
intended, essentially arguing that Justice Scalia’s decision to strike down a
handgun ban in Heller in 2008 meant that Blackstone would not have
considered handguns “dangerous or unusual” weapons to carry in public in
the 1700s.
Justice Scalia used Blackstone’s “dangerous or unusual” language as a
way to reconcile the Heller decision with the Supreme Court’s 1939 decision
in United States v. Miller, which upheld a federal law banning automatic
weapons and sawed-off shotguns.85 The Supreme Court in Miller clearly
upheld the law under a militia-based reading of the Second Amendment,
stating that because sawed-off shotguns lacked a “reasonable relationship to
the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia,” the Second
Amendment does not protect a right to possess them.86 Justice Scalia read
the decision narrowly as only indicative of what types of weapons could be
prohibited, stating the case found that the Second Amendment “does not
protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for
lawful purposes.”87 Reaching for a Founding-Era analogue to his view that
particular weapons could be banned, Scalia referenced the “dangerous or
unusual” language used by Blackstone.88 Justice Scalia was not altering
Blackstone’s eighteenth century understanding of the phrase—or
interpreting its substantive meaning at all—but rather reasoning by historical
analogy in the distinct context of weapon prohibitions, rather than public
carry regulation. Unfortunately, a few courts have failed to distinguish
between these contexts.
In a recent Ninth Circuit decision, the court used gun rights proponents’
interpretation of the phrase to argue that the carrying of handguns could not
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89. Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044, 1064 (9th Cir. 2018) (“clearly not all weapons can be
characterized as ‘dangerous or unusual,’ else Heller’s exemption of Second Amendment protection
for weapons of that kind would swallow the Amendment’s protections as a whole.”).
90. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 936 (7th Cir. 2012).
91. Statute of Northampton, 2 Edw. 3, 258 c. 3 (1328) (Eng.). Later versions of the statute
used similar language. 20 Rich. 2, c. 1 (1396) (Eng.) (prohibiting going or riding “by Night nor by
Day armed . . . without the King’s special License.”).
92. Patrick Charles, Faces of the Second Amendment Outside the Home, 60 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 1, 21 (2012). Defendants were also charged for violating the statute for wearing pistols. Rex
v. Harwood, Quarter Sessions at Malton (Oct. 4-5, 1608), in 1 NORTH RIDING RECORD SOCIETY,
QUARTER SESSIONS RECORDS 132 (1884) (prosecution of defendant “armed and weaponed with a
lance-staff plated with iron, pistolls, and other offensive weapons . . .”).
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have fit into the historical prohibition on going armed with dangerous or
unusual weapons. The court reasoned that classifying handguns as
“dangerous and unusual” would be inconsistent with Heller, which said
prohibitions on dangerous and unusual weapons were constitutional while
striking down a handgun ban.89 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit stated in a
decision striking down an Illinois prohibition on carrying firearms in public,
“the Court cannot have thought all guns are ‘dangerous or unusual’ and can
be banned, as otherwise there would be no right to keep a handgun in one’s
home for self-defense.”90
This anachronistic analysis, using a twenty-first century Supreme Court
decision on a different Second Amendment issue—home possession—to
alter the meaning of an eighteenth-century tradition is inconsistent with the
history of how the Statute of Northampton and its founding era analogues
were enforced. In addition, gun rights plaintiffs do not identify any weapons
that would have been considered “dangerous or unusual” in the founding era
and earlier if guns do not fall within that category. Indeed, it is difficult to
imagine what would fall within that set if guns were excluded.
Excluding guns from the prohibitions in the Statute of Northampton as
applicable during the Founding Era is a clear misreading of the historical
record. Every piece of evidence about the understanding and enforcement
of the law points to its application to weapons generally. To start with the
Statute of Northampton, simply prohibited a person to “go nor ride armed,”
without any requirement about a weapon’s dangerousness.91 Two centuries
later, after firearms became common, Queen Elizabeth I called for
enforcement of the statute against those carrying “Daggers, Pistols, and such
like, not only in Cities and Town, [but] in all parts of the Realm in common
high[ways].”92 Similarly, guides for justices of the peace instructed them to
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“arrest any person, not being in his highness service, who shall be found
wearing [] guns, or pistols, of any sort.”93
Colonial and early state analogues of the Statute of Northampton also
clearly covered firearms. A 1686 New Jersey statute prohibited going armed
with “any pocket pistol, skeins (a knife), stilettoes (a knife), daggers or dirks,
or other unusual or unlawful weapons.”94 A few years later, Massachusetts
prohibited public carry using analogous terms by calling for the arrest of
anyone who “shall ride or go armed offensively.”95 Offensive weapons were
a term of art akin to dangerous and unusual weapons that would have
included “guns, pistols, daggers, and instruments of war,” but not necessarily
a hatchet or horsewhip.96 Other early American statutes used similar terms,
or directly prohibited going armed with handguns.97 Tennessee, for
example, prohibited the carrying of “belt and pocket pistols,” describing
them as “dangerous and unlawful weapons.”98
The best articulation of what the phrase “dangerous and unusual
weapon” meant during the founding period comes from State v. Huntly, an
1843 North Carolina Supreme Court opinion.99 In the case, Huntly was
indicted for arming himself with “pistols, guns, knives and other dangerous
and unusual weapons,” specifically a double-barreled rifle, which he used to
threaten a neighbor over a business dispute. Huntly, like many modern
plaintiffs, argued that the firearm he carried did not qualify as a dangerous
and unusual weapon. The Huntly Court decisively rejected this argument,
stating:100
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93. 1 GILBERT HUTCHESON, TREATISE ON THE OFFICES OF JUSTICE OF THE PEACE app. I at
xlviii (1806) (citing OLIVER CROMWELL, INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING CONSTABLES (1665)); see
also ROBERT GARDINER, THE COMPLEAT CONSTABLE 18 (1692).
94. 1686 N.J. Laws 289 (emphasis added).
95. 1784 Mass. Las 105, ch. 27.
96. 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE ON THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 665 (John Curwood
ed., 8th ed. 1824);
see also King v. Hutchinson, 168 Eng. Rep. 273, 276 (1784); SIR WILLIAM OLDNALL RUSSELL &
CHARLES SPRENGEL GREAVES, TREATISE ON CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 124 (1854); JOEL
PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF STATUTORY CRIMES 214 (1873).
97. See e.g., 1821 Me. Laws 285, ch. 76, § 1 (“[No one] shall ride or go armed offensively,
to the fear or terror of the [people].”); 1836 Mass Acts 750, §16 (Prohibiting going armed with “a
dirk, dagger, sword, pistol, or other offensive and dangerous weapon.”); 1838 Wisc. Laws 381, §
16 (same); 1846 Mich. Laws 690, c. 162, § 16 (same).
98. 1821 Tenn. Pub. Acts 15-16, An Act to Prevent the Wearing of Dangerous and Unlawful
Weapons, c. 13 (every person so degrading himself by carrying a dirk, sword cane, Spanish stiletto,
belt or pocket pistols,” shall pay a fine).
99. State v. Huntly, 25 N.C. 418 (N.C. Sup. Ct. 1843).
100. Id.
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It has been remarked, that a double-barreled gun, or any other
gun, cannot in this country come under the description of
‘unusual weapons,’ for there is scarcely a man in the community
who does not own and occasionally use a gun of some sort. But
we do not feel the force of this criticism. A gun is an ‘unusual
weapon,’ wherewith to be armed and clad. No man amongst us
carries it about with him, as one of his every day
accoutrements—as part of his dress—and never we trust will the
day come when any deadly weapon will be worn or wielded in
our peace loving and law-abiding State, as an appendage of
manly equipment.101
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101. Huntly, 25 N.C. 418.
102. HAWKINS, supra note 96, at 489, 798.
103. MICHAEL DALTON, THE COUNTRY JUSTICE 425, 443–44 (1737).
104. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 936 (7th Cir. 2012); see also Young v. Hawaii, 896
F.3d 1044, 1064 (9th Cir. 2018).
105. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS 78 (2012).
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This view aligns with that of Hawkins, who made clear that there are
unique, limited circumstances in which it is expected for someone to be
armed, such as noblemen wearing “weapons of fashion as swords, etc., or
privy coats of mail.”102 Similarly, the use of weapons “being only for Sport”
would have been considered lawful, because the weapons would not be
deemed unusual and likely to terrify the public.103
Plaintiffs and some courts attempt to convert this broad and nuanced
historical meaning into a much more cabined category based on dicta in
Heller connecting the term “dangerous and unusual weapons” with
prohibitions on machine guns.104 This approach imports language from a
twenty-first century Supreme Court decision as an interpretive tool for
understanding eighteenth- and nineteenth-century sources. This deference
to modern judicial definitions rather than historical understanding misreads
Heller and is fundamentally inconsistent with the core originalist cannon that
legal texts have a fixed meaning established when a text was adopted.105
Further, under the gun rights reading, “dangerous and unusual
weapons” seems to have been a null set during Blackstone’s period. If
carrying the weapons of the time—handguns, rifles, swords, and daggers—
was not prohibited, what would have been? Machine guns were few and far
between in Blackstone’s era, and it is doubtful he was concerned with a sailor
returned from a long voyage going armed with a boomerang or a scimitar.
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Looking at the historical sources as a whole, the only reasonable reading of
Blackstone’s term is that it covered firearms.

Conclusion
Courts considering challenges to public carry licensing laws are both
interpreting the Second Amendment and making important public policy
decisions. Who may carry firearms in public and under what circumstances
are extremely important public safety issues. Studies have shown substantial
increases in gun assaults and murder when stringent laws regulating the
carrying of firearms in public are repealed.106 The Supreme Court has
mandated that history play a role in adjudicating the answer to these
important public policy discussions. The litigants and judges owe it to the
public that will have to live under the law created by these cases to present
and consider the best historical analysis possible.
Unsupported and misleading historical arguments like those discussed
here demean and undermine the judicial process. How can citizens have
faith in the courts when they are being presented with and make decisions
based on tall tales, wildly out-of-context quotes, and intellectually dishonest
arguments? Our justice system deserves better.
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106. See John Donohue, Abhay Aneja et al., Right-to-Carry Laws and Violent Crime: A
Comprehensive Assessment Using Panel Data and a State-Level Synthetic Control Analysis (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23510, 2018).
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